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Associations and the Constitution: Four Questions About Four
Freedoms'
NELSON TEBBE**

When should a constitutional democracy allow private
associations to discriminate? That question has become
prominent once again, not only in the United States but abroad
as well. John Inazu provides a provocative answer in his
impressive Article, The Four Freedoms and the Future of
Religious Liberty. According to his proposal, "strong
pluralism," associations should have a constitutional right to
limit membership on any ground, including race. Strong
pluralism articulates only three limits: It does not apply to the
government, to commercial entities, or to monopolistic groups.
In this Response, I raise four questions about Four Freedoms.
First, I ask why exactly strong pluralism should be preferred to
the existing settlement between associational interests and
equality values. Second, I draw a parallel between strong
pluralism and broadersorting theories, and ask about the choice
of a level of generality or social organization on which to
promote sorting. Third, I interrogate strong pluralism's three
limits, and finally I ask whether extending the theory beyond
regulation to government funding can be defended on a liberty
theory such as strongpluralism. I conclude by commending Four
Freedoms to everyone interested in these pressing questions.
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When should a constitutional democracy exempt groups from
antidiscrimination laws? That question has become newly
foregrounded in law and politics, not only in America but abroad as
well.' Conflicts invoking it often feature religious groups, but the
debates raise conceptual issues that extend further, to all civic or
voluntary associations. How should such groups be treated by
constitutional regimes when their convictions conflict with
antidiscrimination values?
John Inazu has made a fascinating contribution to the effort to
answer this question in his impressive Article, The Four Freedoms
and the Future of Religious Liberty2 ("Four Freedoms"). Because his
proposal is skillfully defended, and because it diverges from current
legal doctrine, it is well worth engaging.3 Here, I put to one side
Inazu's historical account, and I foreground instead his doctrinal
recommendation and its normative rationales. In brief, he argues that
four basic freedoms rooted in the First Amendment-speech, press,
religion, and assembly-should be understood to support "strong
pluralism."' The core of strong pluralism is easy to describe:
Government action should not be permitted to burden civic groups in
their exercise of the four freedoms, and, in particular, it should not
interfere with membership and leadership decisions.s That principle
1. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Introduction, in RELIGION AND EQUALITY LAW XX-XXi
(Nelson Tebbe ed., 2013) (providing a conceptual overview of religious freedom and
equality law from an international perspective); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and
the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing such conflicts in the
United States and France); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and
Religion and Arguing off the Wall, SLATE.COM (Nov. 25, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/newsandpolitics/jurisprudence/2013/11/obamacarebirth_controlmandate
_lawsuit_how_a_radical-argument went-mainstream.html.
2. John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L.
REv. 787 (2014).
3. Strong pluralism has predecessors. Koppelman points out that several prominent
scholars have argued for "an absolute right of noncommercial associations to exclude
unwanted members." Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an
Absolute Right to Discriminate?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 27, 27-28
(including in this group David Bernstein, Dale Carpenter, Richard Epstein, John
McGinnis, Michael McConnell, Michael Paulsen, and Nancy Rosenblum).
4. Inazu, supranote 2, at 848.
5. Id. at 794.
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applies not only when the government is acting as regulator, but also
when it functions as a funder of general programs.6 Furthermore,
protection extends not only to membership and leadership decisions,
but also to employment determinations' and perhaps more broadly to
decisions about whether to serve customers, patients, clients, or
students.' And it applies to associational decisions made on any basis,
including race. 9 Only three limitations temper the proposal. It does
not apply to government entities, to commercial concerns, or to
monopolistic groups.o Otherwise, strong pluralism applies
categorically. For example, it would protect a golf club that wished to
discriminate in membership and even in employment on various
grounds, including race and religion, as long as the club was not
monopolistic in the relevant sense. 1 Both membership and
employment could conceivably be limited to, say, men or
nonminorities. Strong pluralism's arguments would also support
protection for a homeowners' association organized as a nonprofit
organization to control housing around the club.
A paradigm case for strong pluralism is ChristianLegal Society v.
Martinez,12 where the Supreme Court upheld Hastings Law School's
"all comers" policy for student groups. According to the policy,
groups were required to welcome all students into their membership
and leadership if they wished to qualify for official recognition.14 The
Christian Legal Society ("CLS") applied for recognition despite its
policy of excluding students who failed to adhere to its theological
beliefs on sexual morality.'" Hastings denied recognition to CLS
6. Id. at 794, 845-46.
7. See, e.g., id. at 823 (applying strong pluralism to the employment case of HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)); id. at 825
(considering "whether a Catholic charity can refuse to hire a Muslim social worker").
8. Whether the proposal applies to restrictions on the people a group may servecustomers, patients, students, or clients-is an interesting question not explicitly addressed
in Four Freedoms. The arguments for strong pluralism would suggest protection for this
kind of decision as well, at least in some circumstances.
9. Inazu, supra note 2, at 794, 828-29.
10. Id. at 828-29, 851 & n.308. The limitation on protection for "monopolistic" groups
has been reworded and perhaps expanded in the Article, but it draws on earlier work that
uses the term. See id. at 851 & n.306 (citing JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY'S REFUGE: THE
FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 166-75 (2012)). If this limitation is interpreted to
be robust, that would substantially narrow the differences between strong pluralism and
existing doctrine. However, Four Freedoms suggests a fairly circumscribed interpretation.
For further discussion, see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
11. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 851 n.308 (discussing golf clubs).
12. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
13. Id. at 2974.
14. Id. at 2979.
15. Id. at 2980.
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because the group barred students on the basis of religion and sexual
orientation.16 Strong pluralism opposes the holding of Martinez."
Disallowing CLS from pursuing its expressive and associational
policies flattens social diversity, according to the theory, and it
thereby harms freedom because it deprives students of robust choices
among groups that are truly distinctive.'"
In this Response, I raise four questions about Four Freedoms. All
of them go to the conceptual underpinnings of the proposal, rather
than to the historical argument.
First and most simply, I ask in Part I whether strong pluralism
has good reasons to depart from a settlement that arguably has been
struck between associational and equality interests in American law
and politics. That settlement strikes a provisional balance between
the value of group association, on the one hand, and the value of
freedom and equality for individual dissenters, on the other. Both of
these values enjoy national, constitutional status. When they come
into conflict, for instance because groups seek to limit membership in
ways recognized as discriminatory, current doctrine officiates
between them depending on the social significance of the group. I will
describe this arrangement more fully in Part I, but the key points here
are that the settlement carries democratic authority, because it
reflects and shapes national conversations and conflicts, and that
strong pluralism reworks that settlement. If those claims are
convincing, then the question becomes whether there is a compelling
argument for shifting existing law, so that the terms of the settlement
are more favorable to civic associations and less favorable to
dissenting individuals.
In Part II, I argue that it is possible to understand strong
pluralism as a sorting approach. Theorists in public law recently have
argued that both rights and welfare can be supported by allowing
diversity of values among associations and localities.19 As long as exit
16. Id. ("CLS's bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the
Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual
orientation."). There is a factual dispute about whether Hastings really required groups to
accept everyone at the relevant time, or whether it prohibited discrimination only on
certain grounds, including religion and sexual orientation. See id. at 2982 (describing the
dispute and concluding that the parties would be bound to their stipulation that Hastings
in fact had an "all comers" policy). Because strong pluralism opposes both sorts of
policies, however, the factual controversy is immaterial here.
17. Inazu, supra note 2, at 821-23.
18. See, e.g., id. at 796-97 (describing the benefits of genuine diversity among
associations); id. at 844-45 (arguing for associational diversity in the context of the
Martinez case).
19. See infra notes 55-65.
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and choice are preserved, freedom can be promoted by sorting
because individuals then may select from a diversity of choices the
social or political associations that most closely match their wishes.
Preferences are revealed, and groups can become more responsive to
them. Strong pluralism has a similar conceptual structure, I argue,
and it therefore can profit from sorting approaches. But this analogy
also raises a deep question that all such approaches must face: On
what level of social organization should American constitutionalism
allow sorting among groups, and where should it impose smoothing
instead? A choice may well be necessary, because fostering sorting on
one level of society or commerce will often entail smoothing on
another. Perhaps, for example, the four freedoms would best be
vindicated in Martinez if diversity were protected on the university
level, so that students could select the school that best promoted their
preferred form of student life. Or perhaps cities and towns should be
able to set such policies for schools within their borders. Even state
government could conceivably be the right organizational level on
which to promote sorting. Depending on how this conceptual issue is
resolved, the holding of Martinez itself could be compatible with the
very same commitments that drive strong pluralism.
In Part III, I raise questions about strong pluralism's three
limitations.2 0 Strong pluralism mostly gives pragmatic reasons for
these limits,21 but that seems out of step with an ambitious theory that
refashions doctrine and downplays practical obstacles to its main
proposal. Its strength is its argument from principle, in other words,
not its pragmatic appeal. Given that orientation, it seems reasonable
to press for a defense of strong pluralism's boundaries that is
grounded in legal theory. Why exactly should strong pluralism not
extend to commercial entities, to the many private organizations that
enjoy substantial social power that falls short of a monopoly, and at
least certain government institutions-especially local governments
and service providers like public schools, drug treatment centers, and
hospitals?
Finally, I ask in Part IV why strong pluralism applies in the same
way to generally available funding programs as to regulation. Existing
law works quite differently in the two settings.22 Although the
doctrine is convoluted, individual liberty generally garners less
20. Recall that Inazu's proposal does not protect commercial entities, the
government, or monopolistic groups. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 828-29, 851 & n.308
("Strong pluralism . .. is limited to the voluntary associations of civil society.").
21. Id. at 828-29 (describing these limits as setting out a "pragmatic middle ground").
22. See infra Part IV.
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constitutional protection from defunding than from regulation, on the
theory that while government must refrain from burdening basic
freedoms, it need not subsidize them. That distinction goes to the
basic conceptual structure of liberty guarantees, as opposed to
equality rights. So even if rights against regulation functioned in the
way that the theory proposes, would that mean that government
would retain little discretion to fund or otherwise support only those
activities that are deemed worthwhile by policymakers operating in
ordinary politics?
What unites these four questions is a concern over the proper
relationships between individuals, associations, and the government
in a constitutional democracy, given the range of choices realistically
open to actors operating within contemporary American law, politics,
and society. Healthy subnational associations and cultures are crucial
for the full formation of individual citizens, but those individuals also
deserve full and equal membership in the political community and
fair opportunity in the economic realm. Strong pluralism addresses
both of those concerns with power and sophistication. Whether its
solution is the most principled and pragmatic one available to
American constitutional actors is the overarching question I will
explore.
I. THE EXISTING SETTLEMENT
An implicit settlement between individual and group rights can
be discerned within contemporary law and politics. This Part
describes that settlement and uses it as a baseline for comparison with
strong pluralism. Although demonstrating it is not possible within the
scope of this Response, I believe that the existing arrangement is the
product of historical conversation and conflict over the proper
balance between competing American values.23 Citizens have faced
off against each other in the context of specific social and political
clashes, which have resulted in commitments and compromises that
are historically contingent. Because that process is ongoing, the
settlement is never fully settled. Yet to the considerable degree that
current law on associations is the product of public conversation and
conflict, it has democratic force, and to the degree that it involves
interpretations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the
23. Because my characterization of the settlement here has a historical dimension, my
omission of Inazu's own discussion of history is regrettable and perhaps a bit unfair. If I
were to support my view of the history, I would obviously have to confront Inazu's elegant
account, which is quite different from the one that I believe undergirds the law.
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settlement has constitutional valence as well. My assertion then is that
the compromise I am describing in this Part has normative authority
because of its democratic and constitutional provenance.
I also hold the view that the settlement is somewhat supportable
by a political morality grounded in a commitment to the value of full
and equal citizenship in a free society. A full moral defense (one that
I do not have the space to offer here) would map only imperfectly
onto the existing arrangement, which to some degree captures only a
modus vivendi and not a principled arrangement. Nevertheless, my
sense is that its basic outlines are defensible in terms of basic political
morality.
People who do not share these two intuitions-that the
settlement carries democratic and constitutional authority, and that it
is somewhat defensible as a matter of moral theory-will find
departures from the settlement less troubling.24 But people who are
inclined toward these two claims will be careful to note how often and
how far strong pluralism takes existing law in a different direction.
This Part lays out those departures.
What is the content of this evolving settlement? In order to
answer that question, it helps to characterize two principal-and
competing-commitments that are implicit in its structure. On the
one hand, individual citizens have the right to form associations with
one another, and, on the other hand, they have a right to equal public
status.25 Conflict between these two commitments arises,
paradigmatically although not exclusively, when groups wish to
exclude or burden dissenters. Discrimination matters most where the
group at issue carries social power, especially in situations where
association with the group involves, or can be converted into,
economic or political advantages. For example, powerful groups can
apportion prestige, offer networking opportunities, or signal
desirability to employers or voters. Precise rationales for resolving
conflicts between associational and egalitarian interests differ
depending on the particular setting-for example, employment
discrimination law stresses equality of opportunity while housing law
24. Inazu himself would not be troubled, and here my omission of his historical
account has real costs. While he would not disagree that existing legal and constitutional
arrangements are contingent, he would find aspects of the current settlement to be
unfaithful to the best understanding of American traditions.
25. For specific illustrations of these interests later in this Part, see infra text
accompanying notes 28-29 (on the right of intimate association), infra text accompanying
notes 34-37 (on equality rights in employment, public accommodations, and housing). For
a classic articulation of the basic tension, see William P. Marshall, Discriminationand the
Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68,69-70 (1986).
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protects against geographic exclusion-but, stepping back, it is
possible to identify the general contours of a compromise between
the interests of individuals who wish to associate with one another
and those who dissent or are excluded. This settlement is partly legal
and partly political, it is partly constitutional and partly statutory, and
it is partly federal and partly local. Despite that diversity, it has a
recognizable shape.
In its implicit conceptual structure, the settlement could be
understood to embody a recognition that protection of dissenters
becomes more important as the group increases in significance (for
social standing, political membership, and economic participation).2 6
Notice here that interests on both sides of the settlement have liberty
and equality dimensions.27 Organizers of large groups have an interest
in associational freedom, plainly, but they also have an interest in not
being singled out for government approbation based on their views.
And individual dissenters not only have apparent equality interests,
but they also have an interest in being free to associate with the
group.
Three types of groups or associations can be distinguished,
although they are better conceptualized along a spectrum than in
categories. Intimate associations and small groups, first, enjoy
substantial protection.2 8 Not only is the government not required to
protect excluded individuals from discrimination by these groups, but
it is often prohibited from doing so. For example, a citizen may
choose his or her spouse for reasons that would be strongly
prohibited in other settings-he or she may act, for instance, out of
racial bias or anti-Semitism.2 9 Group formation enjoys constitutional
protection also in the family, in schooling, and in cohabitation with
relatives." Constituting such groups has been removed from ordinary
26. Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) ("Between these poles [of
intimate associations and large business enterprises], of course, lies a broad range of
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection
from particular incursions by the State. Determining the limits of state authority over an
individual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.").
27. For a discussion of the liberty and equality dimensions of free exercise rights, for
instance, see Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1267-68 (2008).
28. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
29. See id. at 619-20 (noting that the right of intimate association protects "family
relationships" and citing marriage cases such as Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
30. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)
(including as protected under the category of intimate associations decisions regarding
marriage, having children, raising and educating children, and cohabitating with relatives).
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politics, at least as a practical matter, and that understanding is
entrenched nationwide.3 1
At the other end of the spectrum, groups that are socially
significant are prohibited from discriminating in certain ways that
would be permitted in more intimate settings.3 2 A reasonable
inference is that government initiatives, such as civil rights laws, may
restrict the ability of large organizations to associate not only because
individuals in them are not bound by the same intimate ties, but also
because those groups have significant power, such that membership in
them can influence social standing, political membership, and
economic participation.33 Organizations like these are impactful
allocators of social capital, and they are subject to regulation when
they engage in exclusionary practices.' Most obviously, large
employers may not take adverse action against workers on prohibited
grounds," and public accommodations like restaurants and theaters
31. Protection for small groups can be seen not only or primarily in judicial decisions,
but also in statutory design and a range of other government policies. For example,
antidiscrimination statutes often exempt small operations and private clubs. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A), (B) (2006) (providing that the Americans with Disabilities Act does
not apply to entities with fewer than fifteen employees and does not apply to "a bona fide
private membership club"); id. § 2000e(b) (providing that Title VII does not apply to
employers with fewer than fifteen employees and does not apply to "a bona fide private
membership club"); id. § 3607(a) (exempting from the Fair Housing Act "private club[s]
not in fact open to the public" under certain circumstances). It would take further work to
demonstrate that these statutory exemptions reflect constitutional understandings, but
they form part of the existing settlement regardless.
32. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (noting that intimate associations do not include
"large business enterprise[s]").
33. See id. at 624 (recognizing the state's "historical commitment to eliminating
discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and
services"); id. at 626 (describing the importance of the Jaycees (a private organization) for
building leadership skills, extending business contacts, and gaining access to employment
opportunities). Although I am not emphasizing it here, the Court also stresses dignitary
harm that is independent of equal opportunity. See id. at 625 (emphasizing the
"deprivation of personal dignity" and "stigmatizing injury" occasioned by discrimination
in public accommodations (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 18-24 (2000) (articulating a concept of social capital); cf. Simon
Szreter & Michael Woolcock, Health by Association? Social Capital, Social Theory, and
the Political Economy of Public Health, 33 INT'L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 650, 656 (2004)
(distinguishing between forms of social capital that cross social hierarchies and those that
do not, and setting out a role for the state in building up the former). See generally Sidney
Tarrow, Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on
Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 389 (1996) (arguing
that social disintegration is due partly to structural inequalities and not simply to a decline
of social capital).
35. See, e.g., § 2000e-2(a). The federal statutes referred to in this paragraph are
supplemented by important state and local antidiscrimination laws.

926

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

may not exclude people for discriminatory reasons. Landlords and
lenders are subject to similar restrictions," and so forth. Across a
variety of contexts, groups of substantial social significance are
limited in their ability to associate, and individual dissenters are
protected. This aspect of the settlement reaches not just commercial
entities, but nonprofits as well."
Some of these large groups are state entities, and against them
individuals have rights that are constitutional in a straightforward
way. But oftentimes the entities are not affiliated with the
government in any strong sense. Even so, they can be prohibited from
discriminating by statutory law that may be federal, state, or local.39
Much of this legislation is so basic to American arrangements that we
take it to be fixed. That is true, for example, of antidiscrimination
statutes in the areas of employment, housing, lending, and the like.40
Given the practical entrenchment of antidiscrimination law for
socially significant entities, it is not outlandish to say that equality
rules on this end of the spectrum are required of the government.
In the middle of these two poles fall groups with respect to which
government is neither prohibited nor required to enact
antidiscrimination measures. State and local lawmakers have applied
antidiscrimination law to such associations in various ways and to
various degrees.4 1 Prominent examples of organizations that still
36. Id. § 2000a(a)-(b) (prohibiting "discrimination or segregation in places of public
accommodation").
37. Id. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination in the sale and rental of residential
properties under the Fair Housing Act); id. § 3605(a)-(b) (prohibiting discrimination in
residential loans).
38. See, e.g., id. § 2000e(b) (exempting only "bona fide private membership club[s]"
from Title VII's prohibitions on employment discrimination but not all entities that qualify
as nonprofits for tax purposes); see also Quijano v. Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129,
131-33 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the term "bona fide private membership club" is
narrower than the category of all nonprofit entities).
39. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984) (considering application
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to the Jaycees, a private organization). Racially
restrictive covenants for home ownership are prohibited by constitutional law, even
though the primary actors are private, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 1 (1948), but that
rule is exceptional as a doctrinal matter.
40. Some have concluded that law in this domain actually has a constitutional
character, despite its location in statutes, but that argument is not critically important here.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237-42
(2001) (construing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which concerns public accommodations
and employment, as a "super-statute").
41. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 2013) ("All persons ... are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation
condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
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openly discriminate can be found even in jurisdictions that generally
have protective civil rights regimes. The Racquet and Tennis Club on
Park Avenue in New York City, for example, still excludes women
from membership.42 Other jurisdictions are even more permissive of
such groups, of course, and some are less.43 Underlying the discretion
that governments enjoy in this middle range may be an implicit
recognition that it can be difficult to balance conflicting commitments
to the rights of group members and dissenters when the affected
entities fall somewhere between intimate groups and groups that are
obviously public accommodations.' Governments have greater
leeway on such questions, particularly on the state and local levels.
This overview reconstructs the basic principles implicit in judicial
doctrine and statutory law, and it makes it possible to see how that
law negotiates basic commitments that are constitutive of American
arrangements in this area. Importantly, the settlement I have
described can be understood not just as the product of brute political
conflict and compromise, though it certainly is that in part, but also
the result of a national conversation, conducted in the context of
particular historical developments, about the proper balance between
associational and equality interests-a conversation that has both
political and constitutional dimensions.
Strong pluralism shifts this settlement in favor of associations.
Individual dissenters must yield to the group, with less regard for
whether the group is socially significant.45 (Again, strong pluralism
recognizes important exceptions, which are addressed below in Part
III.) So, again, golf clubs might well be able to discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, or gender-they would be constitutionally
privileges or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571d (West Supp. 2012) (prohibiting golf clubs from discriminating
even in membership on the grounds of "race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex,
gender identity or expression, marital status or sexual orientation," under certain
conditions).
42. See Amy Zimmer, Men-Only Clubs in NYC: After Augusta National Allows
Women, Will Big Apple Clubs Follow Suit?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2012, 1:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/21/augusta-national-now-accepts-women-all-malenyc-clubs n_1818998.html; see also N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-102 (1986) ("The term
'place or provider of public accommodation' . . . shall not include any club which proves
that it is in its nature distinctly private. A club shall not be considered in its nature
distinctly private if it has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service
and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or
beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for the furtherance of
trade or business.").
43. See supra note 41 (citing examples of state prohibitions on discrimination).
44. But see infra Part II for an alternative explanation based on sorting theory.
45. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 794, 828-29 (describing the proposal).
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protected from antidiscrimination laws in membership and even
employment-as long as they did not exercise monopolistic social
power.46 Nonprofit hospitals, regardless of their size, would be able to
take employment actions on grounds that are today prohibited as
discriminatory, as long as the hospitals did not qualify as
monopolistic. Conceivably, even bar associations could return to the
age of exclusion.4 7
If the settlement I have described deserves any normative force,
perhaps as a consequence of its democratic or constitutional
character, then departures from it require justification. Putting to one
side history as an independent rationale, as I am doing here (with
some regret), two main reasons emerge for adopting strong pluralism.
First, there is the concern that modern civil rights laws are so
widespread and powerful that they will flatten civic diversity so that
individuals will be deprived of robust choice.48 This is an important
theme in Four Freedoms, and it rightly emphasizes the importance of
civil society to American conceptions of democracy. 49 The danger,
however, is that this concern may discount too steeply the other side
of the existing compromise-the interests of dissenting individuals
within or excluded by such groups. Harms to such individuals can be
serious, according to the settlement's implicit values, especially when
the groups control access to important social, political, or economic
resources such as professional networking or employment."o
Second, there is an argument that civic associations with strong
independence from the state are necessary for healthy formation of
the identities and beliefs of individual citizens, who are in turn crucial
to debate and difference in a democracy." Again, that value is
46. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
47. In another work, Inazu expresses some doubt about whether his theory applies to
professional associations, along with political parties and labor unions. See INAZU, supra
note 10, at 16.
48. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 797-98 & n.34 (describing the benefits of genuine
diversity among associations and citing Michael W. McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 466 (2000) ("Genuine pluralism
requires group difference, and maintenance of group difference requires that groups have
the freedom to exclude.")); cf Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)
("According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially
important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority.").
49. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 788 (describing the four freedoms protection of "a
pluralistic civil society that tolerated genuine disagreement").
50. Inazu makes some room for this concern with his anti-monopolistic principle. See
infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
51. Cf Inazu, supra note 2, at 790 (noting the "culture-forming" function of groups in
civil society); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 ("Protecting [intimate] relationships from
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critical.52 Will formation, however, can and does have multiple inputs,
of which voluntary associations form only one. Family and other
intimate communities are primary sites for inculcation of norms, and
that is part of the reason that they are constitutionally protected
against legal flattening.5 3 Government too can have an influence on
will formation, for example, by expressing and inculcating the
importance of equal citizenship, among other values. Moreover,
official involvement works only within its jurisdiction. As I noted
earlier in this Part, subnational governments are given significant
latitude over whether and how to implement antidiscrimination
norms when it comes to civic associations of moderate size and
significance.54 That discretion creates diversity of a different sort:
local and regional.
Given the multiplicity of inputs into the formation of individual
identity and belief, strong pluralism requires a theory for why civic
organizations ought to be privileged over intimate associations and
political bodies. Why should civil society have a disproportionateand constitutionally mandated-influence on the social construction
of individual citizens?
This second argument, about will formation, raises an issue with
additional ramifications, namely how divergent levels of social
organization interact in strong pluralism. Given the indisputable
value of diversity and choice, how do we fix the level of social
organization on which to pursue those values? The next Part pursues
that question from the perspective of theories that focus on exit and
sorting.
II. STRONG PLURALISM AS A SORTING THEORY

One way to think about strong pluralism is as a pro-sorting
principle. This theoretical frame offers a way to think about strong
pluralism's benefits using a free market analogy, but it also poses
difficulties that require further argument if they are to be overcome.
One of these is the challenge of specifying the proper level of analytic
unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.").
52. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?,
99 Nw. U. L. REv. 839, 873-76 (2005) (defending a limited right to exclude based on the
value of associations for the formation of beliefs).
53. I am putting to one side child raising and public education of minors, which raise
complicated questions not addressed directly by Four Freedoms. Even among adults,
intimate associations acculturate.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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generalization or social organization on which to implement the
proposal.
Sorting theories take their impetus from the work of Charles
Tiebout. 5 He and his followers developed a model that found an
early application to local governments, although its implications
extended much more broadly. According to the model, it may make
sense to allow towns and cities to offer diverse levels and types of
taxation and services." That diversity allows individuals to choose the
municipality with the policies that best match their preferences.57
Government will be made more responsive to citizens on this model,
and overall welfare will be increased. For example, towns might elect
to deemphasize education and lower taxes, attracting residents who
do not have children or who prefer private schooling. Moreover,
policymaking without attention to population migration may not be
able to accurately gauge preferences based solely on citizen voting or
voice." Of course, the model relies on robust assumptions: that
citizens have full information about the mix of taxation and services
that governments are actually offering, that they are fully able and
willing to move to a community that best matches their preferred mix
of taxation and services, and that a town's decisions in this regard do
not impact neighboring jurisdictions."
Law scholars have long appreciated the explanatory power of the
Tiebout model in the areas of property and land use, but they have
also explored its utility in other areas of public law, such as
federalism,'
nonestablishment, 61 immigration,62 and general
55. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 416 (1956) (setting forth a model that "yields a solution for the level of public
expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population more
adequately than they can be reflected at the national level"); see also Christopher Serkin,
Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1658-59 (2006) (citing sources developing the Tiebout model).
Another important influence on sorting theories is ALBERT 0. HISRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).

56. See Tiebout, supra note 55, at 422.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 423. Revealing citizen preferences through migration turned out to be "a
big selling point for the model." Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious
Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles,2005 SuP. CT. REV. 135, 151.
59. See Tiebout, supra note 55, at 419.
60. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions
Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and
Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 84 (2013).
61. See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 58, at 135. For a different approach to local authority
over religious freedom, see generally Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the
Doctrine and Discourseof Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1810 (2004).
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constitutional law." This work has applied the model not just in
contexts of geographical diversity, where citizens may express their
preferences by relocating, but also in broader situations where people
face choices among employers, health providers, educational
institutions, and so forth.' Governments offer optional benefits in a
range of contexts, and they commonly package those programs with
costs or conditions. Citizens then may select among combinations of
benefits and obligations. In theory, offering a diversity of goods and
attendant duties has the potential to better match government action
with citizen preferences across a wide range of institutional contexts.
Again, this assumes choices that are real, and it assumes good
information along with the cognitive and material resources to act on
it.65
Legal theorists have also explored the dangers of sorting and the
places where it consequently should be subject to government
regulation. In particular, sorting raises the specter of homogeneity.66
In the context of geographic migration, homogeneity can begin to
track political boundaries, raising a set of concerns about undesirable
forms of self-segregation.67 Another challenge is that jurisdictions
may adopt policies without reflection or debate, so that
responsiveness to policy preferences is apparent only. 68 Negative
externalities and spillover effects also must be policed so that
responsiveness in one community does not impose costs on
neighboring polities. 69 Finally, market-based approaches to
government policymaking can have unfair distributional effects on

62. See, e.g., Cox & Samaha, supra note 60, at 84 (citing sources).
63. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1355-61 (2012).
64. See, e.g., Cox & Samaha, supra note 60, at 81-82 (defining sorting broadly).
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id. at 86; Samaha, supra note 58, at 171.
67. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 28-29 (1998) ("Tiebout
... assumes that a city is similar to a voluntary association, such as a political organization,
church, or chat group. People are seen as choosing a city the way they choose a country
club: what attracts them is the fact that they share interests in common with others making
the same choice. Indeed, this homogeneity is said to promote efficiency.. .
68. See Cox & Samaha, supra note 60, at 86.
69. Cox and Samaha issue several warnings: (1) sorting should involve choices that are
"meaningful and beneficial"; (2) exit rights should be accompanied by entry rights
elsewhere for true sorting to be obtained; (3) people can be limited in their ability to exit
and sort by poor information, judgment, and resources; (4) coordination problems can
yield situations where failure to engage with difference results in anemic choice; and (5)
both positive and negative externalities must be managed. Id. at 87-90. They also allow for
side constraints in the form of universal human rights-interestingly here, including the
right to association. Id. at 91.
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poor and otherwise disadvantaged citizens.70 Once these dangers are
appreciated, interesting questions arise concerning when pro-sorting
measures should be preferred to anti-sorting (or smoothing)
measures. Oftentimes the tradeoffs are difficult to evaluate, but they
are present regardless.
Work on sorting has long recognized, although it has not often
emphasized, that the model also applies to situations of sorting
among private actors, including associations." When government
policy affects such sorting, many similar options are open to officials
with analogous benefits and dangers.
On the benefits side, allowing diversity among civic
organizations, including in their membership policies, permits
associations to express and implement ideas that give them character.
In particular, they are not forced to conform to egalitarian notions
favored by the state. That then provides individuals greater freedom
of choice and enables better matches between personal and group
ideologies. Not only do potential members benefit from enhanced
pluralism, but so do existing ones who may wish to exercise their
option to exit.
Strong pluralism also presents an argument for exit and choice
that is not foregrounded in the sorting literature, namely that it
fosters groups that have a stronger identity and, therefore, are able to
engage in more robust and effective will formation. That, in turn,
enriches a democratic polity that now includes a wider and more
passionate range of divergent perspectives.
On the cost side, private groups can promote sorting in a much
starker way than governmental entities-they can engage in outright
exclusion. For example, when a town offers a distinct mix of services
and taxes, that decision affects incentives, but it does not involve an
outright ban on relocation.72 And the point applies more generally,
outside of political jurisdictions, to government benefits and
70. See Frug, supra note 67, at 31 (arguing that the consumer-oriented vision of city
services "has a built in bias in favor of the rich"); Richard Schragger, Consuming
Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1826 (2003) (critiquing the Tiebout approach to
local government, partly because of its effects on "[t]he losers in the interlocal competition
for low-cost, high-tax-base homeowners-the urban poor, racial minorities, families in
search of affordable housing, [and] the elderly").
71. In fact, the Tiebout model for local government was partly built on an analogy to
voluntary associations. See Frug, supra note 67, at 28-29.
72. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (articulating a right to
travel in the context of relocation from one state to another by indigent citizens). But see
Frug, supra note 67, at 27 (discussing exclusionary zoning and "fiscal zoning"); Schragger,
supra note 70, at 1828 (same).
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programs. Although policymakers can place conditions on those
programs that impose strenuous incentives, they generally are not
permitted to coerce protected choices.7 3 Private associations, by
contrast, may flatly exclude.74 Voluntary associations are allowed to
reject members or deem them ineligible for full membership or
leadership positions.
Now of course vigorous sorting can happen even without clear
membership rules because groups have other ways of signaling that
some people are unwelcome.75 Still, sorting by actual exclusion is
stronger than what Tiebout enthusiasts usually have in mind when
they promote policies that allow people to choose the regimes that
best serve their interests and ideas. Exit is voluntary in the Tiebout
model, and subsequent choice is not constricted by barriers to entry.7 6
In sum, strong pluralism is strong indeed-it represents a
particularly robust form of sorting in at least two ways. First, it does
not just allow groups to express ideals and interests in ways that allow
individuals to affiliate with groups they favor, but it allows them to
erect outright bans. Second, strong pluralism imposes few limits-it is
tempered by little in the way of smoothing or anti-sorting. Existing
law recognizes dangers in overly aggressive self-selection with respect
to non-intimate associations, as I described in Part I, but strong
pluralism would permit and even encourage substantial homogeneity
within civic associations, including ones that are large or significant,
so long as they are not commercial entities and so long as they do not
exercise monopoly power, defined in a particular way.
So far, nothing I have said in this Part should be objectionable to
proponents of strong pluralism. Yet the comparison to Tiebout
suggests that they must face a question that attends all forms of
sorting models: On what level of analytic generalization or social
organization ought government promote sorting? After all, the

73. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 ("If a law has no other purpose ... than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it
[is] patently unconstitutional." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("There can be no clearer
example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire .... Freedom of
association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.").
75. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1837, 1850-57 (2006) (describing the role of "exclusionary vibes,"
chiefly in the property setting).
76. See Tiebout, supra note 55, at 419 (assuming full mobility).
77. For more discussion on these limits see infra Part III.

934

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

benefits of diversity and individual choice could attach at any number
of levels."
To see the difficulty, recall the example of Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez. Strong pluralism takes this as a paradigm case
and argues for allowing CLS to exclude from both membership and
leadership positions students who do not agree with the
organization's theological principles, including its teachings against
homosexual conduct.79 It argues that pluralism in civic society would
thereby be preserved."
But another possibility would be to work toward those same
benefits, only at the level of the university rather than the student
club. That way, universities could choose to implement either strong
pluralism or a civil rights approach, and students could select the
university that best matched their predilections. Those interested in
CLS-a nationwide student organization-could choose a campus on
which the organization was allowed to restrict its membership, while
students who cared more about gay and lesbian rights could choose a
school with an "all comers" policy. That would promote pluralism
and diversity, only at the university level rather than the level of the
student organization." Would not that approach vindicate strong
pluralism?
Understanding strong pluralism as a sorting theory thus raises
the question of how to choose the relevant level of analytic generality
or social organization, and it shows that conclusions about core cases
could turn on the answer. Thinking about levels of generality also
reveals a feature of strong pluralism that could otherwise be
overlooked: while it promotes sorting and pluralism on one level, it
imposes smoothing or flattening on others. For example, if strong
pluralism were adopted and Martinez were reversed, student
organizations at Hastings Law School might well become more
distinct from one another. But universities would become less diverse
78. On the related question of levels of government and the Tiebout model, see
Serkin, supra note 55, at 1661-67.
79. Cf Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980-81 (2010) (explaining
CLS's membership policy and the school's decision to deny it official status because of that
policy).
80. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 822-23.
81. Spillover effects might increase diversity on the university level. Universities that
make no change in their policies-that decline to adopt a new "all comers" policy, for
instance-may experience an influx of students who wish to form CLS chapters and other
organizations that are not open to everyone. All schools could thereby be affected.
Interestingly, diversification at the university level could make exclusionary membership
rules by groups like CLS less necessary at any one school.
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because none of them could offer an "all comers" policy that would
suit egalitarian students.' And, moving the other way on the
spectrum of generality, membership within student organizations
would become less diverse (because that, of course, is the point of
exclusionary membership policies). Therefore, strong pluralism may
promote pluralism on certain levels of social organization, but it is
potentially homogenizing on others.
Now, an objection might be that Hastings is a state school and
therefore bound to respect the membership policies of student
organizations in a way that a private university is not. Yet a
categorical distinction between public and private is difficult to
defend using the arguments for strong pluralism, as I will explain
more fully in Part III. Drawing the line at public entities is
particularly puzzling in the context of sorting theory, since the
Tiebout model was specifically formulated with local governments in
mind, along with nongovernmental actors."
In fact, thinking beyond universities suggests broad applications
of sorting models to associational life. To continue with the CLS
example, it would be possible to promote selection not just among
universities, but among the towns or cities whose laws regulate them.
College applicants could choose a school in a town whose legal
atmosphere promoted the student life they preferred. Perhaps more
realistically, a state legislature could seek to dictate antidiscrimination
laws for public and private universities within its borders. That could
send an even clearer signal to potential students-they would know
that all the universities in a particular state featured
antidiscrimination rules for student groups, while schools in another
state allowed greater leeway for CLS and other groups that wished to
limit membership in certain ways.' That possibility is not entirely
fanciful. After Vanderbilt University began to enforce an "all
comers" rule, the Tennessee legislature passed a bill that would have
82. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 3, at 53 (arguing that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640 (2000), actually "induced uniformity" because states could not thereafter
choose whether to allow the Boy Scouts to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation).
83. See Tiebout, supra note 55, at 416 (providing a model unaer which "market-type"
solutions exist for the provision of goods by local governments).
84. But see Serkin, supra note 55, at 1662-64 (providing reasons why sorting may not
work as effectively on the state level, including the costs of relocating to another state
(though Serkin is focused on homeowners rather than students), more intense interestgroup dynamics that prevent state legislatures from responding as effectively to the
revealed preferences of citizens, and the prevalence at the state level of agency
policymaking, which is more insulated from public preferences, compared to legislative
action).
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protected religious student groups, had it not been vetoed by the
governor. Conceivably, state and local governments could become
increasingly interested in determining university policy on such
matters.
In sum, selecting the right level of social organization on which to
promote ideological diversity is a serious issue for strong pluralism.
Even the policy upheld in Martinez itself could be supported by the
very arguments that the proposal features, if they are located on the
level of the university rather than on the level of student
organizations. Strong pluralism needs a theory for choosing the level
of analytic generality or social organization on which constitutional
law should fix the benefits of pluralism and diversity. Without such a
theory, the proposal could miss even its central targets.
III. STRONG PLURALISM'S LIMITS
Strong pluralism articulates three limits: it has no application to
commercial entities," to monopolistic groups,87 or to the
government." Questions surround each of these, and those questions
are united by a concern over whether the limits are grounded in
arguments from principle. Pragmatism alone may not be enough to
support them, especially given that strong pluralism generally
emphasizes principled reasons for its interpretation of the four
freedoms and downplays practical barriers.
A.

Commercial Entities

When Four Freedoms uses the term "commercial groups," it
seems to mean profit-seeking businesses." By excluding only those
groups from its scope, strong pluralism suggests that it applies to all
nonprofit organizations.90 That category includes the student groups,
85. Michael Gryboski, Tenn. Governor Vetoes Bill Challenging Vanderbilt's AllCorners Policy, CHRISTIAN POST (May 23, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.christianpost.com
/news/tenn-governor-vetoes-bill-challenging-vanderbilts-all-comers-policy-75443/. I thank
Jacob Levy for bringing this example to my attention.
86. Inazu, supra note 2, at 794.
87. See id. at 828-29, 851 & n.308.
88. Id. at 828-29.
89. See, e.g., id. (using the term "commercial group").
90. See id. at 829 & n.206. A possible reading is that noncommercial does not mean
the same thing as nonprofit. But that opens up questions about what it does mean. From
the examples given, it seems it cannot exclude all entities that provide employment, or
housing, or social services for a fee. For instance, Inazu relies on Hosanna-Tabor
EvangelicalLutheran Church & School v. EEOC for support, implying that a school run
by a religious organization counts as noncommercial for purposes of the theory, even
though it charges tuition, employs teachers and a staff, and the like. Id. at 824-25 (arguing
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churches, and civic associations that are the primary concerns of the
proposal. But it also seems to include nonprofit hospitals, social
service organizations, universities, labor unions, homeowners'
associations,
political
parties,
an d perhaps
professional
organizations. 91 Potentially, the types and numbers of entities are
large.
So are the organizations themselves, in many cases. Nonprofit
hospitals can have thousands of employees, serve numerous patients,
and boast large operating budgets. Much the same is true of
universities and labor unions. Conversely, many profit-seeking
organizations are rather small endeavors involving only a few people.
What justifies drawing the line here for the purposes of strong
pluralism?
One possibility, of course, is that the harm to individual
customers or employees is potentially much greater when powerful
entities are involved. But nonprofit entities can be powerful in some
of the same ways. Think first of employees. Workers can be affected
in a dramatic way by exclusionary hiring practices, particularly if
those practices become widespread in a society, even if an employer
does not monopolize the relevant labor market. Health care workers
often are employed by nonprofit hospitals and clinics, for example,
and teachers customarily work for nonprofit schools and universities.
Equality of opportunity is one concern behind the current doctrinal
settlement between associational and equality interests that I
described in Part I. And opportunity can be dampened by large
nonprofit employers, particularly in regions where they comprise a
significant part of the local workforce.
Moreover, the power of nonprofit entities extends far beyond
employment. Think next of housing, and in particular of
homeowners' associations, which are typically set up as nonprofit

that "free exercise and association rights ... should have protected the church"). In fact,
the case concerned employment discrimination specifically. See Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 694 (2012). Similarly, the
school at issue in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), is noncommercial for purposes
of the theory, despite the fact that it charges tuition and employs teachers. Inazu, supra
note 2, at 838-39 & n.251 (discussing Runyon). Golf clubs are noncommercial too, even
though they charge for services and employ people. See id. at 851 & n.308. What about
homeowners' associations that are set up around many golf clubs and are organized as
nonprofit corporations? Or associations for lawyers and other professionals? As long as
some of these organizations are included, the concerns articulated in this Section have
traction.
91. On bar associations, see Inazu, supra note 2, at 829 n.207 (expressing doubts).
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entities.' Much housing in the United States is organized under such
associations,93 and nothing in Four Freedoms prohibits them from
setting up restrictive policies. Put simply, the harms of strong
pluralism grow potentially more concerning as the significance of the
association increases, and that is true of for-profit and nonprofit
entities alike.
Another possible justification for limiting strong pluralism to
nonprofits is that commercial concerns are less apt to be expressive or
ideological in nature. Hospitals and universities are organized as
nonprofits presumably because they seek objectives other than
increasing the wealth of the organization and its constituents. Yet
even if this is true in general, it surely is not true in every particular.
As we have been reminded from the recent litigation over the Obama
Administration's contraception mandate, many profit-seeking
corporations have moral objectives as well.94 And that is true not just
of firms run or owned by religious people, but also of companies
dedicated to environmental or social justice concerns such as Ben &
Jerry's and Whole Foods.95 Conversely, homeowners' associations are
not typically ideological, even if they are not concerned with profits."

92. See 26 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (exempting certain homeowners' associations from
taxation); Robert C. Ellickson, A Reply to Michelman and Frug, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1602,
1604 n.5 (1982) ("[H]omeowners associations are typically nonprofit organizations.").
93. As of 2012, about thirty-one million Americans were estimated to live in
homeowners' associations. Industry Data, CMTY. ASS'N INST., http://www.caionline.org
/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); see also Evan McKenzie,
Common-Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow, 14 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE
203, 203-04 (2003) (describing the prevalence and rise of common-interest housing
developments, a term that includes homeowners' associations).
94. Cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (holding that corporations are capable of enjoying free exercise rights), cert.granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that "for-profit,
secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise"), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013) (noting that the cases have been consolidated). For important recent work on the
question of whether profit seeking corporations have free exercise rights, see generally
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014);
Robert K. Vischer, Do For-ProfitBusinesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 369 (2013).
95. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked PrivateSquare, 51 Hous. L. REV. 1, 54-55 &
n.352 (2013) (arguing that many corporations express values and beliefs, and citing the
examples of Ben & Jerry's and Whole Foods).
96. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 224 (2003) (noting in table that homeowners' associations typically
"do[] not specialize in production of speech or forums for debate on public concerns"
(emphasis in original)).
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In other words, centrality of a moral vision does not effectively
distinguish commercial from noncommercial entities.97
Perhaps considerations like these explain why strong pluralism
offers pragmatic rather than principled reasons for separating out
commercial concerns.98 Not much is said about this, but the pragmatic
considerations probably include the political obstacles to
implementing a rule that protects associations from civil rights laws
all across the American economy. 99 Yet, as I have noted, strong
pluralism would entail shifts in law and politics even within the
bounds it sets for itself.' Principle, not pragmatism, is strong
pluralism's strong suit, in other words. So this turn to practicalities
when it comes to commercial entities is curious-and somewhat
unsatisfying for a theory that otherwise deemphasizes those
considerations. And from a principled perspective, the limit for
commercial entities seems both underinclusive and overinclusive.
B.

Monopolistic Groups

Strong pluralism similarly does not apply to associations that
enjoy monopoly power in a region or market.101 Here too, a kind of
balancing seems to be powering the analysis under the hood.'" Harm
to excluded individuals would simply be too great if monopolistic
entities were allowed to exclude them from membership,
employment, or consumer activity. And, on the other hand, people

97. For other critiques of the distinction between commercial and nonprofit entities in
the proposal for strong pluralism, see Richard A. Epstein, Forgotten No More, 13
ENGAGE 138, 139 (2012), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120517_Epstein
Engagel3.1.pdf (reviewing INAZU, supra, note 10); Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary Is
the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1414 (2012) ("If a for-profit
corporation dissents from the moral norms embodied in a particular law, and we are
confident that the dissent is not solely related to the avoidance of an economic burden,
why should we not want to protect its right of assembly?").
98. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 828-29 ("Centering the pluralist vision on civil society
to the exclusion of the marketplace requires a pragmatic and imperfect line drawing.... It
represents a pragmatic middle ground . . . .").
99. See id. (arguing that limiting the proposal to nonprofits provides a political
compromise between feminists and libertarians); see also John D. Inazu, Factions for the
Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 1435, 1451-52 (2012) (arguing that his distinction
between commercial and noncommercial groups reflects political realities, and cannot be
supported by principle).
100. See supra Part I.
101. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 828-29, 851 & n.308; see also Inazu, supra note 99, at
1453 (elaborating on the "anti-monopolistic test").
102. See INAZU, supra note 10, at 15 ("Sometimes-albeit rarely-the power exerted
by peaceable, noncommercial assemblies will overreach to such an extent that the right
will give way to the interests of the state.").
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who can procure similar benefits from other associations in the region
or market are unlikely to be harmed significantly by the exclusion.
Questions surround these arguments. First of all, associations
may affect excluded individuals not just by denying them a particular
affiliation, job, or service, but by apportioning status or
opportunity.'03 Imagine, for example, that Harvard University begins
denying college admission to applicants who (1) disagreed with its
particular brand of Christian theology, including its teachings on
reproduction and sexual morality, or (2) disagreed with its
progressive stands on the same issues, even if the source of the
disagreement is religious. No one would argue that Harvard enjoys a
monopoly within the education market. Yet it does function as a
significant allocator of social standing, like other elite educational
institutions. Why would strong pluralism refuse to allow a bowling
club to exclude members of out groups if it were monopolistic, yet
exempt Harvard or similar universities simply because less (or other)
prestigious alternatives are available? Which exclusion imposes
greater harm? 0"
Other associations can serve as powerful, if less obvious,
distributors of opportunity and social status. In some parts of the
country, golf clubs work that way. Even if a local municipality
operates a competing public course, the opportunities there for
103. Ashutosh Bhagwat has raised a similar objection to this limitation on strong
pluralism, observing that "power does not require monopoly." Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Liberty's Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the Right of Assembly, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 1381, 1398 (2012).
104. Strong pluralism sometimes does not seem to apply to entities that allocate
prestige. "If membership in the Christian Legal Society at Hastings was a prerequisite to
the most desirable legal jobs, then the Christian Legal Society may well lose its
constitutional protections." INAZU, supra note 10, at 15; Inazu, supra note 2, at 851; see
also Inazu, supra note 2, at 851 n.308 (discussing circumstances that could exclude a golf
club from protection, including professional importance and even desirability for playing
golf). If the anti-monopolistic principle is construed broadly, then the present objection to
strong pluralism becomes weaker. But Four Freedoms suggests that monopolistic
situations are supposed to be "rare." Inazu, supra note 2, at 851; see also INAZU, supra
note 10, at 15 (arguing that monopolistic groups will be "rare[]"); Inazu, supra note 99, at
1453 (noting that "the anti-monopolistic test is set intentionally high-it will capture few
groups"). Yet noncommercial entities that apportion social status are commonplace. That
suggests that the limitation is narrow. Ambiguities crop up elsewhere as well. On one
hand, the theory holds that "[e]quality of opportunity is a crucial part of our constitutional
ethos." Inazu, supra note 2, at 852. But on the other hand, Inazu argues that "[equality of
opportunity] is not self-justifying in all of its applications," id., and that it "ought to focus
on genuine access to power and resources," id., suggesting that perhaps Harvard and
similar associations would be subject to antidiscrimination law. Again, a great deal turns
on how these questions are resolved, and thus on how far the anti-monopolistic limitation
on strong pluralism extends.
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business networking and status improvement may not be as
promising. Many professional organizations are also organized as
nonprofits, and many of them are not monopolists in the strict
sense.'o Strong pluralism may well protect discriminatory practices by
such professional organizations.1 *
In sum, the question is whether focusing on monopolistic groups
captures all of the harms to excluded individuals, or whether instead
it is underinclusive-a relatively weak proxy for detriments that are
better captured by the standard legal model, however imperfectly.
C.

Government

Certainly, the public/private distinction is deeply rooted in our
constitutional understandings and therefore easier to defend as a
limitation on strong pluralism. Yet its conceptual basis is somewhat
puzzling, as the vast literature on the distinction has emphasized."7
Based on its own arguments, strong pluralism might well push for the
benefits of diversity and choice in the context of a vast array of public
entities. Think, for example, of public universities and the argument
offered in Part II that allowing sorting among schools could promote
many of the values driving the theory. If the arguments behind strong
pluralism are persuasive, why not apply them to all institutions of
higher education-in the absence of commercialism or monopoly
power-public and private?
My sense is that although limiting application of the theory to
nongovernmental actors is familiar, it is not obviously supported by
the arguments from legal principle that drive strong pluralism overall.
105. Think for instance of the New York County Lawyers' Association and the New
York City Bar Association, which are registered nonprofits and coexist in the same legal
market. Compare About NYCLA: Governance, N.Y. COUNTY L. ASS'N, http://www.nycla
.org/index.cfm?section=AboutNYCLA&page=Governance (last visited Feb. 25, 2014)
(noting that the NYCLA is a nonprofit organization), with About the New York City Bar
Association, N.Y. CITY B., http://www.nycbar.org/about-us/overview-about-us (last visited
Feb. 25, 2014) ("The New York City Bar Association (City Bar), founded in 1870, is a
voluntary association of lawyers and law students."). In fact, the NYCLA was founded as
an alternative to the only existing bar association in New York City, which discriminated
on grounds of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity. See The Great DemocraticBar Association
of the City, N.Y. COUNTY L. ASS'N, http://www.nycla.org/index.cfm?page=About
NYCLA (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
106. Again, Inazu expresses some doubts about whether the theory applies to
professional associations. See INAZU, supra note 10, at 16-17; Inazu, supra note 2, at 829
n.207.
107. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, The Public-Private
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 144 (2004) (noting the persistence of the public-private distinction
despite an established literature critiquing it, and citing authorities).
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In sum, the question this Part has posed is whether the
limitations on strong pluralism are consistent with the rationales
driving the theory. If they are not compatible, or are not fully
compatible (as seems to be the case), then the puzzle is why
pragmatic considerations should be enough to justify the limitations
when the core argument supporting strong pluralism would mean
important changes to existing constitutional arrangements and
therefore seems mainly principled rather than pragmatic.
IV. THE FOUR FREEDOMS AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING
A fascinating aspect of strong pluralism is that it not only would
preserve the ability of individuals to form associations that could limit
membership in unlimited ways, but it furthermore would protect their
ability to do so while retaining all government benefits that they
would otherwise receive under general programs.os Is this part of the
argument consistent with the conceptual framework of strong
pluralism, given its emphasis on liberty or autonomy?
Constitutional understandings often cut in the other direction.
Government is generally permitted to defund private activities, even
when they are protected against government regulation by liberty
rights." For example, policymakers may refuse to fund a woman's
exercise of her right to terminate a pregnancy, even while they
subsidize carrying the pregnancy to term. 110 Free exercise also may be
selectively defunded."' For example, a state may decline to subsidize
students who wish to major in the study of theology from a faith
perspective, despite the fact that they have a constitutional right to
pursue that course of study. 112 Even in the comparatively protective
context of free speech, government may elect not to support certain
types of speech, so long as it does not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. It may, for instance, decline to fund lobbying by nonprofit
organizations, even when it subsidizes lobbying by veterans'
organizations."' And where "government speech" is found to be
108. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 845-48 (describing the threat to the pluralist vision
from "the government's refusal to extend generally available funding and resources to the
full range of groups in civil society" (emphasis omitted)).
109. For background on the government's latitude to fund or defund constitutionally
protected activity, see Tebbe, supra note 27, at 1271-72, 1282-84.
110. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
111. See Tebbe, supra note 27, at 1267 (defending the government's ability to
selectively defund religious actors, within limits).
112. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
113. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550-51
(1983).
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involved, tax dollars may be distributed to speakers on a viewpointdiscriminatory basis as well.114 There are important differences in
these doctrines concerning funding of privacy, speech, association,
and free exercise-and there are contradictions among them."' But
together they provide a significant measure of government discretion
concerning support for constitutionally protected freedoms, including
freedoms exercised by civic associations.
Unconstitutional conditions analysis is implicated by the
argument as well. In the typical scenario, the government conditions a
benefit that it is not constitutionally obligated to provide on an
individual making a choice that is constitutionally protected and over
which the person has some type of control.116 Although it is
notoriously difficult to articulate a consistent conceptual framework
in this area, government decisions to fund one sort of constitutionally
protected activity and not another are not normally thought to
amount to unconstitutional conditions. To take the example of
reproductive freedom once more, funding childbirth but not abortion
does not amount to an unconstitutional condition, even though both
activities are protected and even though receipt of support is
conditioned on foregoing a constitutional right.'
Conditioning
welfare benefits on carrying any pregnancies to term would, however,
amount to an unconstitutional condition on this understanding." 8
It is therefore a familiar doctrine that government may defund
liberties that it could not prohibit through regulation. The same is not
true for equality rights, of course. Discrimination on invidious
grounds is not permitted even in benefits programs and even if the
government had no obligation to provide the benefit in the first

114. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (interpreting Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991), as an approval of viewpoint discrimination in
government speech, although the government in that case delivered its message through
private speakers); Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648,
648-50 (2013) (critiquing the widespread view that government speech is exempted from
almost all constitutional restrictions, including the First Amendment rule against
viewpoint discrimination).
115. See, e.g., Tebbe, supra note 27, at 1266-67 (describing one such contradiction in
the doctrine).
116. See Cox & Samaha, supra note 60, at 66.
117. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
118. For a general statement of this understanding of the rule against unconstitutional
conditions, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government
Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1942 (2006) ("This is what the Court has in practice
roughly meant by the 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine: While the government may
generally place conditions on the use of benefits that it provides, it generally may not
control the use of the recipient's other assets as a condition of providing the benefit.").
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place.119 A right to equal treatment at the hands of the government
applies to all official action, whereas a right to liberty from
government does not normally entail a right to government assistance
in that activity.120
Strong pluralism goes further than commonplace doctrine and
political morality surrounding funding or unconstitutional conditions.
Two cases seem to drive the theory here. First, again, is Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez. Several judges and scholars have
characterized access to official status as a student organization as a
benefit-it entailed advantages that unaffiliated organizations would
not have enjoyed, including access to university buildings for
meetings, use of electronic resources, participation in the student
activities fair, and a small amount of cash.121 Viewed that way, the
university simply decided which sorts of student organizations it
wished to fund or support (i.e., ones open to all). 22 After all, the
organization remained free to continue its activities, including its
exclusionary practices, after the ruling came down-just without
support. 123 And in fact, CLS did operate for one academic year on an
independent basis while the dispute was ongoing.124 When strong
pluralism opposes the result in Martinez, it therefore demands more
than the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as conventionally
understood.
Second, and more important to the argument, is Bob Jones
University v. United States.125 There, the IRS enforced a rule denying

119. Brown is the canonical example. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
There, states were prohibited from segregating public schools even though they had no
constitutional obligation to provide public education in the first place. Id. at 495.
120. For an argument that equal protection applies even to mere expression by the
government, see Tebbe, supra note 114, at 650.
121. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 845 n.280 (citing authors who have made that
argument).
122. See id. at 844-46 (addressing such arguments).
123. Inazu argues that Martinez involved not only denial of support but also regulatory
exclusion from a public speech venue, id. at 844-45, but his extension of strong pluralism
to benefits makes that point immaterial. Even if Martinez concerned the provision of
benefits, rather than regulation of access to a public forum, it would still violate strong
pluralism.
124. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2981 (2010). During this period,
Hastings allowed CLS to use law school facilities for its meetings and activities and told
the group it would "have access to chalkboards and generally available campus bulletin
boards to announce its events." Id.
125. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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tax-exempt status to organizations engaged in racial discrimination.126
Bob Jones University fell afoul of the rule because it prohibited
interracial dating among students, for theological reasons. 127 Strong
pluralism would reverse that decision, without disagreeing that tax
exemption is a form of government subsidy.128 According to strong
pluralism, it is constitutionally problematic to deny government
support to associations that limit membership on the basis of race and
other socially significant characteristics, just as it is unconstitutional to
prohibit the exclusion outright.
This is a puzzling sort of claim for a theory grounded in liberty or
autonomy to make, at least according to familiar constitutional
thinking about the relationship between government funding and
constitutional liberties.129 Note that the claim by strong pluralism is
not that the IRS violated equality principles by excluding an entity
from support rather than the offending activity. Rather, it is that Bob
Jones exercised its freedom of association or assembly in a particular
way-by deciding which students were eligible to attend the school,
based on their willingness to abide by school rules-and that conduct
was what the government decided not to support.
Where is the stopping point for that line of argument? Inazu is
careful to say that his constitutional rule only applies to general
funding and benefit schemes, but that limit leaves open the possibility
that groups like the Boy Scouts would have a constitutional claim not
only when the state prohibited them from barring gay men from
membership, but when it defunded their activities for the same
reason.'3 0 Is the principle restricted to freedom of association and
assembly, or does it extend to other constitutional liberties as well?
Would Congress now be prohibited from directing funds only to
women in childbirth and not to women terminating their pregnancies
126. Id. at 579 (setting out the IRS rule that "a [private] school not having a racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' within the common law concepts
reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code" (alteration in original)).
127. Id. at 580-81 (recounting that "[t]he sponsors of the University genuinely believe
that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage" and reproducing the school's rule
that "[s]tudents who date outside of their own race will be expelled").
128. See Inazu, supra note 2, at 846 ("Bob Jones is wrongly decided because the
government cannot coherently engage in viewpoint discrimination with respect to a
generally available benefit.").
129. See supra text accompanying notes 113-22.
130. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). In his book, Inazu
questions whether the Boy Scouts should be protected by strong pluralism or whether they
are too monopolistic or public. See INAZU, supra note 10, at 251 n.36. But the point here is
simply that a concededly civic group would not only be protected from anti-discrimination
laws but also be able to claim government funding.
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before the end of their terms? Although some of the argument is
limited to viewpoint discrimination in government creation of public
forums, some of its logic would seem to extend to defunding these
other liberty-based rights as well. If that is correct, then the
ramifications would be significant. Decisions regarding a wide range
of welfare-state funding programs could be removed from ordinary
politics.
Moreover, the precedent it would unsettle goes somewhat
further than strong pluralism explains. Government defunding of
discriminatory practices has been seen by the Court not only to be
constitutionally permitted, as strong pluralism assumes, but
sometimes to be constitutionally required. During the Second
Reconstruction, the Court decided not only Runyon v. McCrary'3 2
which allowed Congress to pass a regulatory ban on racial segregation
by private schools"'-and Bob Jones-which allowed the government
to defund private schools engaged in racial discrimination' 3 4-but also
135
Norwood v. Harrison.
In Norwood, the Justices held that
Mississippi was constitutionally prohibited from supporting private
schools that discriminated on the basis of race, as it had been doing
through a state program that provided free textbooks to public and
private schools alike."' And in another case from the same era, the
Court prohibited a local government from providing grants so that
students could attend racially discriminatory private schools.137
Therefore, when the Court has interfered with ordinary politics in the
area of funding, it has sometimes done so in the opposite direction-it
has limited the ability of government to support private associations
that discriminate in their membership. Admittedly, it is difficult to
imagine either of these decisions being handed down today under
changed social and political circumstances. Yet they underscore the
distance that strong pluralism must move constitutional law in order

131. It could even have implications for government speech, if the same reasons for
limiting government decisions on financial support extend also to government decisions
about which associations to endorse in its communications. Cf. Tebbe, supra note 114, at
650 (arguing that government endorsement is limited by a range of constitutional rules).
132. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
133. Id. at 169; see Inazu, supra note 2, at 838-40 (criticizing Runyon).
134. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,603-04 (1983).
135. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
136. Id. at 466-67.
137. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). The
vouchers were part of a move to close the public schools rather than comply with a
desegregation order. Id. at 221. All the private schools in the jurisdiction were restricted to
whites. Id. at 223. So these were admittedly special circumstances.
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to limit government discretion over funding decisions concerning the
freedom of individuals to associate.
Existing law does set some constitutional limits on the ability of
government to defund constitutional freedom. For example, it
prohibits animus in the religion area,' viewpoint discrimination with
regard to speech,'39 and unconstitutional conditions. 40 I have argued
that inside these limits, government discretion should include the
ability to target religious activity for denial of support.14 ' But even if
that argument fails, it is difficult to imagine compelling reasons for
constitutional law to limit the discretion of policymakers further
without altering the longstanding view that private actors cannot
demand government support even for the exercise of constitutional
liberties.
CONCLUSION

Four Freedoms takes a fascinating look at issues of profound
importance. I have taken this Response as an opportunity to offer
four questions that implicate the relationship between individuals and
associations in American constitutionalism more generally. Everyone
seriously interested in such matters will benefit from reading not only
Four Freedoms, but the rest of John Inazu's evolving work on these
issues.

138.
139.
140.
141.

See Tebbe, supra note 27, at 1327-31.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-31 (1995).
See Tebbe, supra note 27, at 1322-27.
See id. at 1339.

